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Abstract
We present a formal measure of argument strength, which
combines the ideas that conclusions of strong arguments are (i)
highly probable and (ii) their uncertainty is relatively precise.
Likewise, arguments are weak when their conclusion proba-
bility is low or when it is highly imprecise. We show how
the proposed measure provides a new model of the Ellsberg
paradox. Moreover, we further substantiate the psychologi-
cal plausibility of our approach by an experiment (N = 60).
The data show that the proposed measure predicts human in-
ferences in the original Ellsberg task and in corresponding ar-
gument strength tasks. Finally, we report qualitative data taken
from structured interviews on folk psychological conceptions
on what argument strength means.
Keywords: argument strength; coherence; Ellsberg paradox;
probability logic
Introduction
Measuring Argument Strength
Probabilistic models of argumentation became popular in
cognitive science and its subfields including psychology, phi-
losophy, and computer science in recent years (see, e.g., Hahn
& Oaksford, 2006; Haenni, 2009; Zenker, 2013). Like logic-
based nonmonotonic approaches for defeasible argumenta-
tion (see, e.g. Prakken & Vreeswijk, 2002), probabilistic
approaches allow for dealing with exceptions and retracting
conclusions in the light of new evidence. However, in con-
trast to qualitative logical approaches, probability allows for
managing degrees of belief in the sentences involved in com-
mon sense argumentation. Moreover, degrees of belief can
be used to model the strength of arguments (Hahn & Oaks-
ford, 2006; Oaksford & Hahn, 2007; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2006;
Pfeifer, 2007, 2013b).
The concept “argument” is ambiguous. In logic,
it denotes a triple consisting of a (possibly empty)
premise set, a conclusion indicator, and a conclu-
sion set. Consider, for example, the following ar-
gument, which is an instance of modus ponens:
(P1) If I take the train at five (T ), I’ll be home at six (H).
(P2) I take the train at five (T ).
(C) Therefore, I’ll be home at six (H).
Here, (P1) and (P2) are the premises, “Therefore” the con-
clusion indicator and the sentence “I’ll be home at six” is the
conclusion. In argumentative contexts, “argument” may also
denote a premise which speaks for or against a conclusion.
For example “The train conductors are on strike”, can serve
as an argument for concluding that it is better to take the bus.
In what follows, however, we will focus on arguments in the
logical sense only.
How can we measure the strength of an argument? There
are at least two formal approaches to study (probabilistic) ar-
gument strength. In the first approach argument strength is
based on uncertain consequence relations, i.e., by presup-
posing that the conclusion follows to some degree from the
premises. Usually, this is modeled by a conditional prob-
ability of “the conclusion given (some combination of) the
premises” of the argument (see, e.g. Hahn & Oaksford, 2006;
Oaksford&Hahn, 2007). As pointed out by Osherson, Smith,
Wilkie, Lo´pez, and Shafir (1990), measures of confirmation
can serve as models for argument strength (for an overview
of measures of confirmation see Crupi, Tentori, & Gonza-
les, 2007). Measures of confirmation and previous attempts
to model argument strength by uncertain consequence rela-
tions are problematic when arguments involve conditionals,
like the modus ponens above (see premise (P1)): it is far
from clear to give a precise meaning of conditionalizing on
a combination of premises, when the premise set contains
conditional events. There is ample formal and experimental
evidence that uncertain conditionals are best modeled by con-
ditional probabilities (see, e.g., Evans & Over, 2004; Oaks-
ford & Chater, 2007; Over & Cruz, in press; Pfeifer, 2014,
2013a). Therefore, conditionals should be modeled by condi-
tional probabilities. However, this requirement would imply
to measure the uncertainty of a conclusion given (some com-
bination of) the premises. Unfortunately, satisfactory seman-
tics of expressions like
conclusion
︷︸︸︷
C |
premises
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(A and (C|A)) do not exist
yet. Such semantics would, however, be necessary to cap-
ture the underlying logical structure of the modus ponens (for
an approach where conditionals are interpreted as conditional
random quantities which allows for dealing with nested con-
ditionals, see Gilio, Over, Pfeifer, & Sanfilippo, 2017, sub-
mitted). Modus ponens is just a relatively simple example
here: there are, of course, many other argument forms in-
volving conditionals. The inability to deal with conditionals
seems to us to be one of the main reasons, why currently no
formally satisfactory measure of argument exists within the
first approach: measures based on uncertain consequence re-
lations do not seem to be able to deal with the logical form of
the argument.
In this paper, we advocate the second approach to argu-
ment strength. It satisfies the requirement of doing justice to
the logical form of arguments involving conditionals (Pfeifer,
2007, 2013b). Specifically, we define argument strength
based on the following ideas: (i) keep the consequence re-
lation deductive, (ii) assign probabilities to the premises, and
then (iii) define the measure of argument strength based on
the propagated coherent lower and upper probability bounds
on the conclusion (Pfeifer, 2007, 2013b). Probability prop-
agation from the premises to the conclusion is governed by
coherence based probability logic (see, e.g. Coletti & Scoz-
zafava, 2002; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2009; Gilio, Pfeifer, & San-
filippo, 2016). The coherence approach to probability was
originated by Bruno de Finetti (de Finetti, 1970/1974). It
conceives probabilities as subjective degrees of belief. Con-
ditional probabilities (p(C|A)) are primitive. This allows for
zero probabilities of the conditioning event (A). Note that
in standard approaches to probability, p(C|A) is undefined
if p(A) = 0, which is problematic in many argument forms
(see, e.g. Pfeifer, 2014; Gilio et al., 2016). Moreover, coher-
ence allows for managing imprecise probabilities (set-valued
probabilities involving lower and upper probability bounds),
which is relevant for formalising arguments under incomplete
probabilistic knowledge. The above mentioned modus po-
nens, for example, is formalised as follows:
(P1’) p(H|T ) = x
(P2’) p(T ) = y
(C’) Therefore, z′ ≤ p(H) ≤ z′′, where z′ = xy and
z′′= xy+1−y are the best possible coherent prob-
ability bounds on the conclusion.
Following Pfeifer (2013b), we define the measure of argu-
ment strength s on an argument A as follows:
Let z′ and z′′ denote the coherent lower and upper prob-
ability bounds, respectively, on the conclusion of argu-
ment A . Then,
s(A) =def.
precision
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− (z′′− z′))×
location
︷ ︸︸ ︷
z′+ z′′
2
. (1)
Intuitively, measure s combines the precision and the location
of the coherent conclusion probability interval. Specifically,
strong arguments are arguments with low imprecision of the
conclusion probability (measured by the one-complement of
the distance between the upper and the lower probability
bounds, 1− (z′′− z′)) and with conclusion probabilities close
to one (measured by the mean of the lower and upper proba-
bility bound, (z′+ z′′)/2). Of course, precision and location
could be modeled differently (e.g., by using the geometric or
the harmonic mean instead of the arithmetic mean). More-
over, in contexts where the location is more important than
the precision of the conclusion probability interval (or vice
versa), adding suitable weights to formula (1) can adjust the
measure for such cases. However, for the purpose of our pa-
per it is sufficient to keep the measure as simple as possible.
Measure s has a number of plausible consequences: it
ranges always from zero to one (i.e., 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, since z′ and
z′′ are probability values, which are also in the unit interval,
[0,1]). The extreme “0” denotes weak arguments and “1” de-
notes strong arguments. Arguments with conclusion prob-
ability 1, are strong arguments, since s = 1 if z′ = z′′ = 1.
Arguments with conclusion probability 0 (i.e., z′ = z′′ = 0)
are weak arguments, since s= 0. Likewise, probabilistically
non-informative arguments (i.e., z′ = 0 and z′′ = 1) are weak
arguments, since s= 0.
Interestingly, measure s also provides a new solution to the
Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961),1 which we describe in the
next section.
Modeling the Ellsberg Paradox by Measure s
Ellsberg described the following situation (Ellsberg, 1961):
An urn contains 90 balls, of which 30 are red (R) and
60 are black or yellow (B∨Y , where “∨” denotes dis-
junction (“or”) as defined in classical logic). The ratio
of the black and yellow balls is unknown—there might
be anything between 0 to 60 black (or yellow) balls. One
ball is drawn from the urn and you are asked to choose
a bet between two bets. If you take Bet 1, you will win
$100, if the ball drawn from the urn is red. If you take
Bet 2, you will win $100, if the ball drawn from the urn
is black.
Ellsberg predicted that most people choose Bet 1 when asked
to decide which of the two bets they prefer. Then, considering
again the same urn, Ellsberg predicted that people will choose
Bet 4, when they are asked to decide between the following
two alternative bets:
If you take Bet 3, you will win $100, if the ball drawn
from the urn is red or yellow. If you take Bet 4, you
will win $100, if the ball drawn from the urn is black or
yellow.
Ellsberg’s predictions create a well-known paradox as they
violate the independence axiom of rational choice (see, e.g.,
Briggs, 2016). Moreover, Ellsberg’s predictions were ex-
perimentally confirmed in many studies (see, e.g., Becker &
Brownson, 1964; Slovic & Tversky, 1974; MacCrimmon &
Larsson, 1979).
We propose to frame the Ellsberg paradox in terms of prob-
ability logical arguments. Specifically, the premises repre-
sent the probabilistic information given in the description of
the urn, and the conclusions represent the respective bets in-
volved in the Ellsberg paradox. Thus, we obtain four argu-
ments. Each argument speaks for choosing the correspond-
ing bet. The associated argument to Bet 2, for example, is
argument A2:
p(R) = .33
p(B∨Y ) = .67
Therefore, 0≤ p(B)≤ .67 is coherent.
The strength of this argument is denoted by s(A2) and by
applying equation (1) equal to .11 (i.e., s(A2) = .11). Ta-
ble 1 lists the conclusions and the argument strengths s for
each argument for the corresponding four bets involved in the
Ellsberg paradox.
1We thank Kevin T. Kelly for pointing us to the Ellsberg paradox.
Table 1: Conclusions and normative strengths (s) of Argu-
ments A1, . . . ,A4 associated with the four bets involved in the
Ellsberg paradox. The premises are always p(R) = .33 and
p(B∨Y ) = .67.
Conclusion Argument strength
Bet 1 p(R) = .33 s(A1) = .33
Bet 2 0≤ p(B)≤ .67 s(A2) = .11
Bet 3 .33≤ p(R∨Y )≤ 1 s(A3) = .22
Bet 4 p(B∨Y ) = .67 s(A4) = .67
The four argument strength values in Table 1 induce the
following preference orders in the classical Ellsberg task: Bet
1≻ Bet 2, since s(A1) = .33> s(A2) = .11, and Bet 4≻ Bet
3, since s(A4) = .67 > s(A3) = .22 (where X ≻ Y denotes
X is preferred over Y ). This preference order corresponds to
Ellsberg’s predictions and matches the data (see, e.g., Becker
& Brownson, 1964; Slovic & Tversky, 1974; MacCrimmon
& Larsson, 1979).
The functions of the four arguments can be understood in
an epistemic and in a persuasive sense. The epistemic func-
tion of the arguments is to gain knowledge about which bet
should be preferred. The persuasive function of the argu-
ments is to convince someone which bet should be preferred.
In the following section we further investigate the psycho-
logical plausibility of s by an experiment.
Method
Participants
In this experiment 60 university students (mean age 25.9
years (SD = 5.6), 48 females, 12 males) participated for a
compensation of 15¤. All of the participants were Finnish
native speakers and none of them had studied psychology,
mathematics, statistics or philosophy as their major.
Design and Materials
We used three target task types: argument ranking tasks, ar-
gument rating tasks, and the (original) Ellsberg tasks. The ar-
gument ranking tasks first instructed the participants to rank
the strength of arguments A1 and A2 (see Table 1). Second,
the participants were instructed to rank the strength of argu-
ments A3 and A4. The argument rating tasks instructed the
participants to rate the strength of each of the four arguments.
In the original version of the Ellsberg task, participants had to
rank which bets they preferred as described in the Introduc-
tion. We investigated the following questions which relate
argument strength to the Ellsberg problem:
• Do the results of the argument strength rating tasks predict
the responses in the Ellsberg tasks?
• Do the results of the argument strength rating tasks predict
the responses in the argument strength ranking tasks?
Moreover, we explored empirically, whether argument
strength formulated in epistemic or in persuasive terms im-
pacts participants’ reasoning. Finally, we systematically ma-
nipulated the information conveyed in the argument rating
and in the argument ranking tasks by the following indepen-
dent variables: (i) only the uncertainty of the conclusion was
presented, (ii) only the uncertainties of the premises were pre-
sented, and (iii) uncertainties of the premises and the con-
clusion were presented. The instructions introduced the fol-
lowing symbol for marking not conveyed information in the
respective conditions which correspond the variables (i) and
(ii): . By using a 2×3 between-participant design we fully
crossed epistemic versus persuasive formulations and the ma-
nipulated information conveyed in the arguments. In the epis-
temic booklets we used knowledge-oriented phrasings like
“Which argument is stronger to know which bet to choose?”,
whereas in the persuasive booklets we used according phras-
ings like “Which argument convinces stronger which bet to
choose?”. The experimental conditions are explained in Ta-
ble 2.
Table 2: Experimental conditions (Cd 1–Cd 6; N = 60).
Presented probabilities Epistemic Persuasive
Premise & conclusion Cd 1 (n1 = 10) Cd 2 (n2 = 10)
Conclusion only Cd 3 (n3 = 10) Cd 4 (n4 = 10)
Premise only Cd 5 (n5 = 10) Cd 6 (n6 = 10)
Argument ranking tasks In these tasks, the participants
were instructed to imagine two friends arguing about which
bet the participant should choose. Then, argument A1 for
Bet 1, and argument A2 for Bet 2 were presented to the par-
ticipant, e.g.:
Argument 2 for Bet 2
I am % sure that the ball drawn from the urn is red.
I am % sure that the ball drawn from the urn is black
or yellow.
Therefore, I am at least 0 % and at most 67 % sure that
the ball drawn from the urn is black.
The participants were then presented with the question
“Which argument is stronger to know which bet to choose?”
(Kumpi argumentti on vahvempi sen tieta¨miseen, kumpi veto
kannattaisi valita?) in the epistemic condition. In the per-
suasive condition, they were asked “Which argument con-
vinces you stronger which bet to choose?” (Kumpi argument-
ti vakuuttaa sinut vahvemmin siita¨, kumpi veto kannattaisi
valita?). Then, the participants were instructed to indicate
their choice by ticking the respective box for Argument 1 (i.e.,
A1) or Argument 2 (i.e., A2). Finally, the participants ranked
Argument 3 (i.e., A3) and Argument 4 (i.e., A4).
Argument rating tasks In these tasks participants were
presented with the same four arguments as in the argument
ranking tasks. They were asked to carefully reconsider each.
Instead of using forced choice response formats, each argu-
ment was followed by a question, e.g., “How strong is Argu-
ment 2 for choosingBet 2?” (Kuinka vahva Argumentti 2 on
Vedon 2 valitsemiseksi?; original epistemic formulation) or
“How strong isArgument 2 for convincing to chooseBet 2?”
(Kuinka vahva Argumentti 2 on vakuuttamaan Vedon 2 va-
litsemisesta?; original persuasive formulation). The partici-
pants were asked to mark their responses on a scale (see Fig-
ure 1).
Figure 1: Answer scale used in the argument rating tasks.
Ellsberg tasks Here, as explained in the introduction, the
participants had to choose which rankings among bets they
preferred (Bet 1 or Bet 2 and Bet 3 or Bet 4). All participants
were presented with the same Ellsberg tasks.
Procedures
Participants completed the booklets individually in a quiet
room. At the beginning of the testing, participants were in-
formed to take as much time as needed for completing the
tasks. Furthermore, they were instructed not to look back on
their previous responses. After reading the introduction the
participants worked on tasks which differed from the Ellsberg
problem (and which are not in the scope of the present paper).
After that, the target tasks were presented in the following or-
der: (i) argument ranking tasks, (ii) argument rating tasks,
and (iii) the Ellsberg tasks. Finally, the participants filled in
demographic data and answered questions about the difficulty
and clearness of the tasks. Each session concluded by an
interview to further explore argument strength from a qual-
itative point of view: we asked how the participants solved
the tasks and what they thought determined the strength of
an argument. Participants used on the average 9.6 minutes
(SD = 2.8) to work on the target tasks and to fill in the final
questions in the booklet.
Results and Discussion
We performed Fisher’s exact tests to compare the impact of
the different booklets on the response frequencies in the ar-
gument ranking tasks and in the Ellsberg tasks. Moreover,
we tested influences of the different conditions in the argu-
ment rating tasks by analyses of variance. After performing
Holm-Bonferroni corrections we did not observe any signif-
Table 3: Percentages of argument preferences in the argument
ranking tasks (rnk(A)) and in the Ellsberg tasks (N = 60).
% rnk(A) Ellsberg % rnk(A) Ellsberg
Bet1 73,3 93,3 Bet3 25,0 23,3
Bet2 26,7 6,7 Bet4 75,0 76,7
icant differences. We therefore pooled the data for further
analysis (N = 60).
Ellsberg’s predictions The majority of responses in all
three types of tasks (i.e., argument ranking, argument rat-
ing and Ellsberg task) are consistent with Ellsberg’s predic-
tions. Our findings also replicate empirical findings reported
in the literature (see, e.g., Becker & Brownson, 1964; Slovic
& Tversky, 1974; MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979). More-
over, our data suggest that classical findings in Ellsberg tasks
carry over to (isomorphic) problems formulated in terms of
argument strength.
Table 3 shows how the participants ranked the arguments
in the argument ranking tasks and how they ranked the bets
in the Ellsberg tasks. Bet 1 (resp., argument A1 supporting
Bet 1) is more frequently chosen than Bet 2 (resp., A2 sup-
porting Bet 2). Likewise, Bet 4 (resp., argument A4 support-
ing Bet 4) is more frequently chosen than Bet 3 (resp., A3
supporting Bet 3).
Moreover, we constructed the underlying preference orders
of the argument strengths and the bets from the participants’
responses in all the three task types. This allows one to see
which choice strategies were most commonly used. In all
tasks, strategies consistent with the independence axioms of
rational choice were less frequently preferred, as can be seen
in Table 4. For constructing the preference orders based on
the responses in the argument strength ratings tasks, we made
the following assumption: if the strength of an argument Ax
was rated higher than the strength of an argument Ay, then
the corresponding Bet x is preferred over Bet y. Again, our
findings replicate the predictions of Ellsberg and the previ-
ous empirical findings (see, e.g., Becker & Brownson, 1964;
Slovic & Tversky, 1974; MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979).
Table 5 shows the mean argument strength rating re-
sponses. As predicted by measure s, the mean argu-
ment strength ratings reflect the Ellsberg predictions, i.e.,
mean rating(A1) > mean rating(A2) and mean rating(A4) >
mean rating(A3).
Consistency among the data Based on the argument
strength ratings, we predicted the participants’ choices in the
ranking and in the Ellsberg tasks. The data support our pre-
dictions: the argument strength rating responses predict the
ranking responses in the Ellsberg tasks. The rating responses
also predict the responses in the argument strength ranking
tasks (see Table 6 and Table 7).
Table 4: Percentages of responses consistent with Ellsberg’s
predictions (E), the independence axiom of rational choice
(I). The preference order R can be interpreted as a reversed
version of E . “(x,y) ≻ (u,v)” means “arguments (resp. bets)
x and y are preferred over arguments (resp. bets) u and v”.
Preference order responses consistent with s are in bold.
Preference Tasks (N = 60)
Order A Ranking Ellsberg A Rating
(1,4)≻ (2,3)E 56.67 71.67 56.10
(2,3)≻ (1,4)R 8.33 1.67 4.88
(1,3)≻ (2,4)I 16.67 21.67 21.95
(2,4)≻ (1,3)I 18.33 5.00 17.07
Table 5: Means and standard deviations (SD) of the argument
strength ratings on a scale from 0 (“extremely weak”) to 10
(“extremely strong”; N = 60).
A1 A2 A3 A4
Mean 5,20 3,98 5,77 6,95
SD 2,64 2,58 1,74 1,87
As some participants had rated the arguments for the bets
equally strong, no predictions could be derived in these cases.
When taking into account only those cases, in which making
predictions was possible, the responses of roughly 3/4 of the
participants were consistent with their responses in the rank-
ing tasks. In the argument strength ranking tasks, 77.3 %
of the participants chose as predicted between the first two
bets and 75.0 % chose as predicted between the second two
bets. For the Ellsberg tasks, we observed similarly high per-
centages (i.e., 75.0 % and 70.8 % of the participants, for the
first and the second bet rankings, respectively). This is again
strong experimental support for the psychological plausibility
of measure s.
Table 6: Predictions of bet rankings in Ellsberg tasks based
on responses in the argument strength rating tasks (N = 60).
Ranking
% Bet 1 vs. Bet 2 Bet 3 vs. Bet 4
Chose as predicted 55.00 56.67
Did not choose as predicted 18.33 23.33
No prediction made 26.67 20.00
Finally, we discuss qualitative data taken from structured
interviews on folk psychological conceptions on what argu-
ment strength means.
Interview results After the participants completed the pa-
per and pencil tasks, we collected folk psychological con-
Table 7: Predictions of argument strength rankings based on
the responses in argument strength rating tasks (N = 60).
Ranking
% A1 vs. A2 A3 vs. A4
Chose as predicted 56.67 60.00
Did not choose as predicted 16.67 20.00
No prediction made 26.67 20.00
ceptions on what “argument strength” (argumentin vahvuus)
means by structured interviews. We asked the participants
how they would define argument strength in their own words.
Participants who had received the persuasive booklets, we hy-
pothesized, mentioned persuasive aspects (like how convinc-
ing arguments are) more frequently than those of the epis-
temic condition. Moreover, participants who had received the
epistemic booklets focused more on epistemic aspects (like
truth and knowledge) than those of the persuasive condition.
However, the interview responses do not confirm these hy-
potheses.
The responses to the interview question concerning the
meaning of “argument strength” reflected features of our
measure s. Specifically, the location of the coherent conclu-
sion probability interval was referred to by almost all of the
participants. For many participants the location seemed to be
more important than the precision of the coherent conclusion
probability interval. They had, for example, focused solely
on the lower probability bound of the interval and ignored the
upper bound or responded based on the mean value of the
interval.
However, a few participants also referred to the precision
of the coherent conclusion probability interval by sentences
like:
“The size of this gap between 33 [%] and 100 [%] is
so big that it increases the uncertainty.” (Epa¨varmuutta
lisa¨a¨ se, etta¨ va¨li 33:n ja 100:n va¨lilla¨ on niin suuri)
Some participants also talked about the truth or correctness of
the probability bounds of the conclusion. For them, the argu-
ments were strong, when the probabilities in the conclusions
were correct, almost regardless of the values in them.
Finally, we note that the interview responses provide folk
psychological evidence for using location and precision of
conclusion probability intervals for evaluating the strength of
uncertain arguments. Location and precision are the key in-
gredients of our measure of argument strength s.
Concluding Remarks
We proposed a formal measure of argument strength and
showed how it predicts responses in Ellsberg tasks. Specif-
ically, we framed choices among bets in terms of probability
logical argument forms. We confirmed experimentally that
Ellsberg’s predictions can be justified by argument strength
rankings and argument strength ratings.
Since the proposed measure exploits tools available in
coherence-based probability logic and since it is based on a
deductive consequence relation, it allows for dealing with ar-
guments involving conditionals. The proposed measure has
many plausible consequences, which calls for future formal-
normative and experimental research for modeling also other
argument types, like the conditional syllogisms.
Understanding argument strength is important for theo-
ries about reasoning and argumentation in general. Our pa-
per sheds formal and experimental light on what argument
strength means.
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